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Abstract
At the heart of political organization, we find weak and atomized individuals who
aggregate their power to challenge concentrated power. Wine politics show us that
within market economies we find the same political movements. Markets, like poli-
tics, consist of institutions that differentially embed, codify and distribute power. In
the case of France, small, individually weak wine producers became powerful in the
aggregate; unified French grape growers came together to force a deal with the eco-
nomically dominant wine merchants. Their joint political power was institutionalized
in power-sharing, state-backed corporatist producer organizations. In contrast, small
Italian producers failed to cooperate systematically and aggregate their power.
Stronger organization enabled the construction of an institutional comparative
advantage and higher prices for regulated French terroir wines. Economic sociolo-
gists claim markets are ‘socially embedded’. This article demonstrates markets are
‘politically embedded’: French market dominance results from effective power shar-
ing mechanisms across the supply chain.
Key words: regulation, production networks, organizations, consumers, power, trust
JEL classification: L1 market structure, firm strategy, and market performance; L2 firm objectives,
organization, and behavior; D2 production and organizations
1. Introduction
Since the 1970s, the global wine market has undergone dramatic transformations. This was
the first time that it appeared probable that the singular French dominance of the quality
wine market might be threatened by international competitors. California wines beat top
Bordeaux in blind tastings in the 1976 Judgment of Paris (Taber, 2006), and Italian wines
began receiving global recognition for their high-quality ‘SuperTuscan’ table wines. These
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turning points were accompanied by three other important trends—the rapid decline of
wine consumption in traditional wine consuming countries, the European Union’s attempt
to actively decrease the number of vineyards to stabilize table wine prices via the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP), and the increase in the ‘New World’ quality and volume of wines
produced and consumed. Indeed, a recurring story in today’s wine world is the anticipated
diminished significance of French wines specifically and ‘Old World’ wines broadly.
On paper, the French and Italian quality wine markets share the same strict geographic
regulation. Quality Italian DOC regulation (denominazione di origine controllata, intro-
duced in 1963) was directly modeled on the successful French AOC regulation (appellation
d’origine controˆle´e, introduced in 1935). Both claim to protect terroir, or a delimited area
with a distinct cultural heritage and geographic characteristics. The regulations link geo-
graphic areas with specific rules of production, including allowable grape varieties, maxi-
mum yields and grape growing methods. These production standards are determined by the
producers themselves, and they theoretically act as a de facto quality indicator, where the
protected place names—such as Champagne, Bordeaux or Barolo—should serve as a shared
brand. Yet despite sharing the same strict production regulation and similar attributes—
such as similar production volumes and a long history of wine production—the wine
markets in the two countries look dissimilar. Notably, French wine producers maintain a
stranglehold at the highest end of the market. In fact, French producers both earn more than
twice of their Italian counterparts for a bottle of regulated quality wine (ANI International/
European Commission, 2012) and face relatively inelastic demand as compared to Italian
and other national producers (www.wineaustralia.com).
This article investigates the mechanisms underlying the mystery of French dominance. It
suggests that their market dominance is a matter not of inherent French terroir superiority,
but rather of a superior method of political organization, specifically how producers coordi-
nate the problem of supply chain asymmetries. Specifically, French market dominance is the
result of how producers used specific political advantages to respond to supply chain issues
and construct robust market advantages. This article will demonstrate this claim by compar-
ing and contrasting three variables: producer mobilization, state legitimacy and perception
of common goals. Variation among these three political factors provided French producers
with distinct organizational advantages, enabling them to solve market failures, create the
perception of market differentiation and construct an idea of ‘innate’ quality which pro-
tected their markets. Relying on extensive personal interviews and comparative market data,
this article will demonstrate two points. First, we find superior market outcomes when pro-
ducers can organize to solve endemic market failures, namely informational and power
asymmetries. Second, we observe effective supply chain dynamics in political and economic
environments in which actors perceive compromise with other rival producers as advanta-
geous. The evidence indicates that markets are ‘politically embedded’ and that market insti-
tutions ultimately reflect the ability or failure of actors to come together to address collective
market failures.
2. Information and power: previous literature on quality signaling,
supply chain structure and producer organization
Producers face two principal issues in a market context: the problems of information and
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more information on the product than then other party; a seller nearly always has more
information on a product’s quality than a buyer. This is the dynamic George Akerloff
describes in his ‘Market for Lemons’: if sellers are unable to reliably convey quality to
buyers, prices converge on a low-quality price as higher quality products are kept off the
market (1970). Market power asymmetries arise when a few powerful buyers push down
prices for interchangeable sellers. If left unaddressed, either the informational or the power
asymmetry can lead to the collapse of differentiated quality production.
The idea of information asymmetries has a particular significance in quality markets.
Unlike ‘typical’ product markets, quality markets compete on product differentiation con-
veyed by market signals, rather than by price (Karpik, 2010). These signals are socially con-
structed (Zhao, 2005; Fourcade, 2012), and small, real qualitative differences in these
markets can be associated with vast price differences (Karpik, 2010; Ro¨ssel and Beckert,
2012). These signals can include classifications (Zhao, 2005; Karpik, 2010; Fourcade,
2012), moral values appeal (such as ‘green production’, ‘fair trade’, etc.), product
accessibility and other factors (Boltanski and The´venot, 2006; Eymard-Duvernay, 2007;
Diaz-Bone, 2009) including price itself (White, 1985–2002). These signals match differenti-
ated products with consumer identity, such as environmental, traditional or local (Bourdieu,
1984; Diaz-Bone, 2009).
Convention theorists consider these quality signals to be shared, intersubjective social
frames through which producers indicate quality, norms, and standards to one another and
to consumers. Convention theorists develop upon Harrison White’s initial insight that pro-
ducers signal quality in part through by situating themselves at price points near similar pro-
ducers (2002), positing quality conventions as cultural logics that enable producers to
coordinate to collectively produce market goods. These conventions are routinized princi-
ples for the organization of production, created by repeated behavior of producers, to serve
as a response to uncertainty and reflecting the culture and values embedded in networked
relationships. In other words, conventions are collective schemata for the perception of qual-
ity (Boltanski and The´venot, 2006; Eymard-Duvernay, 2007; Diaz-Bone, 2009). The role of
the consumer in this model is passive, consistent with Bourdieu’s homology theory, or the
notion that consumers seek quality cultural goods that ‘go together’ (homologous) with their
identity because they are situated in roughly the same social spaces as the cultural product.
Therefore, producers meet demand without expressly having to seek it: ‘the supply always
exerts an effect of symbolic imposition’ (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 227). Consumption then reflects
and interacts with values established by producers. Convention theory elucidates the market
mechanisms that arise to address information asymmetries by focusing on the repeated
norms and behaviors linking similar producers. The weakness of this approach is that it is
static and apolitical, with no mechanism to explain either market change or the source of
these conventions.
Gary Gereffi introduces the notion of supply chain power to the conversation on pro-
ducer dynamics. Gereffi (1999) describes two types of producer linkages in a supply chain:
producer-driven and buyer-driven. Producer-driven systems are characterized by high bar-
riers to entry for the inputs of production, whereas buyer-driven systems are highly competi-
tive commodity chains controlled farther down the production chain by branded
manufacturers and retailers. In producer-driven markets, producers resist or create demand
rather than following it, whereas buyer-driven markets are highly competitive, and pro-
ducers respond to market signals and compete on price rather than differentiation.
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According to Gereffi, producer-driven products are perceived as special and thus are less vul-
nerable to the challenge of near substitutes due to high barriers to entry for input factors.
The producer-driven market parallels the quality markets described by convention theorists.
Gereffi complements convention theory by linking producer supply chain dynamics to differ-
entiated quality markets. In markets where power rests with retailers, or where there are few
barriers to entry for input factors, producers have less ability to protect and differentiate
their product.
Gereffi outlines a relationship between producer linkages and the level of market protec-
tion, whereas convention theorists describe the impact of producer dynamics on the con-
struction of quality norms. Yet both of these approaches fail to explain why some producers
find themselves in these differentiated quality markets while others are relegated to more
competitive, less differentiated mass markets. Specifically, they omit political dynamics and
political organization from the model; they explain what markets may look like when mar-
ket failures are addressed, but not who solves these failures or under what conditions.
Additionally, power dynamics are omitted from the analysis both within and across supply
chains. These failures must be addressed for the aforementioned signaling mechanisms to
thrive in quality markets.
Neil Fligstein’s analysis of the role of politics in constructing market protection begins to
address this gap. Fligstein (2002) posits that barriers to entry are politically constructed in
an effort to seek stability by fending off market challengers and secure firm survival. He
argues that incumbent firms capitalize on political incentives to protect their market advant-
age, and then challenger firms attempt to compete on this terrain. Market evolution then
resembles political evolution, as incumbents repeatedly attempt to protect their markets, and
market organization resembles political organization. States provide the incentives to organ-
ize and, once producers are organized, states can provide institutional support and legiti-
macy for producer groups. These political incentives shape how producers organize to
create ‘stable worlds’ of economic competition.
Though Fligstein does not use the expression ‘political embeddedness’,1 his argument
illustrates the definition provided by Zukin and DiMaggio: ‘the manner in which economic
institutions and decisions are shaped by a struggle for power that involves economic actors
and nonmarket institutions, particularly state and social classes’ (1990, p. 16). Fligstein’s
(1996) framework informs the current analysis, but my exploration of politics and of politi-
cal embeddedness diverges from his on some critical points. If markets are politics, what is
the relationship between political attributes, producer organization and quality production?
And the question of how political advantages actually shape market institutions and thus
market outcomes goes largely unanswered. Fligstein argues that markets are social situations
that can only come into being when an array of state attributes exist, including property
rights, governance structures, currency, rule of law and rules of exchange. I refine and chal-
lenge his theory and operationalize the idea of political embeddedness, introducing three
1 The term political embeddedness can be found elsewhere in economic sociological literature, princi-
pally in studies of Chinese political economy (Michelson; 2007; Liu and Halliday; 2011; Haveman
et al., 2017). In these works, the term consistently bears a greater resemblance to Zukin and
DiMaggio’s idea of structural embeddedness, or ‘the structured social connections that shape eco-
nomic exchange’, than to political embeddedness. This is in part due to the unique relationship
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variables which support the emergence of institutionalized cooperation and compromise:
strong producer groups, the perception of state legitimacy and the idea of a shared or com-
mon interest. Divergence on these political variables explains why French producers were
able to organize into institutions, I argue, and establish the differentiated market space
described by Gereffi and the convention theorists. Thus, the pages that follow seek to sys-
tematically link economic sociology with political science and elucidate which political
advantages producers rely upon to create and defend quality markets.
I argue that French producers dominate Italian producers at the high end of the market
due to their divergent political capacities to resolve market asymmetries and thus construct
effective market institutions. Producer mobilization and subsequent bargains shape pro-
ducer incentives, giving rise to different clustered ideas of quality, manners of production,
pricing and quality signals as indicated by convention theorists. In other words, politics cre-
ates the foundation upon which market behavior rests. I specify three variables (political
incentives) which French producers had but their Italian counterparts did not. Producer
politicization refers to the history of producer organization, voting rights and market spe-
cialization. State legitimacy includes the perceived legitimacy of the state as a quality guaran-
tor, the perceived autonomy of the state from captured interests and the perceived levels of
clientelism. Finally, our cases vary in the producers’ ability to unite behind a shared objec-
tive. French producers had some history of branding wine with geographic origin and a lim-
ited number of quality producers. Under these circumstances, producers were able to unite
together behind the idea of terroir to create stable markets and exclude challengers. Italy, a
quality market challenger with virtually no notion of terroir, lacked a strong shared histori-
cal idea to unite producers.
These three political attributes enabled French producers to construct effective producer
organizational structures, which protected input suppliers and enabled French producers to
both define and protect a definition of quality. Italian producers tried to copy the French
model, but they were faced with a different set of political attributes. Variation in these three
factors provided French producers with organizational and thus market advantages, ena-
bling them to address market failures, create the perception of market differentiation and
construct an idea of ‘innate’ quality which protected their markets. The political regulation
evolved to fit the strengths of French producers and the French state, and not the strengths
of their Italian counterparts. As a result, the formally identical regulation failed to guarantee
quality (information problem) or to shift production incentives (market power) in the Italian
case, leaving Italian producers in a more competitive, buyer-driven marketplace.
My findings are the result of extensive personal interviews, and they do not describe a
linear recipe to the construction of high value-added markets. Rather, they explore the inter-
play between producer mobilization, power asymmetries and rules for value, linking politi-
cal analysis to the sociological discussion. I begin with a brief description of my data and
methods, followed by a comparison of the French and Italian wine markets. The third sec-
tion, and the heart of the article, considers the relationship between politics, organizational
outcomes and production strategies in each of my two cases.
3. Data and methods
I obtained the qualitative data for this project through 148 semi-structured interviews, nor-
mally ranging between one and two hours in duration. I conducted these interviews with an
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array of experts, producers and policy makers, across the high and low ends of the French
and Italian wine sectors, in a total of 11 wine producing regions. My interview subjects
included the following: grape growers; wine merchants; wine promoters; cooperative direc-
tors; geographically-based appellation organizers at the local, regional and national levels;
wine journalists; wine historians; wine economists and wine lawyers. Topics covered during
the course of an interview varied by the professional position of the interview subject, but
the principal topics investigated included the following: Local producer group politics,
national regulatory legitimacy and politics, notions of quality production, ideas on trust and
competition with other producers, and current market challenges. Interviews were tran-
scribed, and results were categorized by topic and analyzed.
In France, I conducted interviews in Champagne, Burgundy, Bordeaux, Languedoc and
Paris over three visits totaling 15 months. In Italy, I conducted interviews in Sicily, Tuscany,
Piedmont, Puglia, Lazio, the Veneto and Emilia-Romagna. These interviews were also con-
ducted over three visits, this time totaling six months. I triangularized my research via inter-
views with producers, political organizers and wine lobbyists in both the USA (California
and Oregon) and Germany (Rhineland-Palatinate); as well as with actors from luxury manu-
facturing in France and Italy (producers, professors, and instructors at French and Italian
fashion/luxury technical schools; lobbying firms; producer organizations; and lawyers from
elite luxury houses). Finally, secondary data was collected through available sources during
my stay at INRA (Montpellier, France) and visits to ISMEA (Rome, Italy) while I was a
scholar at Collegio Carlo Alberto (University of Turin). In addition to these data sources, I
relied heavily on export data collected by the Wine Economics Research Centre at the
University of Adelaide.
4. A comparison of the French and Italian wine markets
French and Italian producers continue to dominate wine production in terms of volume and
price. In 2014, France led global production with 47 million hectoliters, and Italy came in
second with 45 million (OIV, 2015). In 2014, French wine exports totaled e7.7 billion, and
Italian wine exports totaled e5 billion (OIV, 2015). However, there is an important distinc-
tion between these dominant producers: Italian and French wine has similar per unit prices
for both table wines and lightly regulated ‘protected geographic indicator’ wines, but signifi-
cant value differences conferred by regulated quality wine. France’s appellation d’origine
controˆle´e (AOC) wines average e5.20 per liter (e6.72 if one includes Champagne), whereas
Italian denominazione di origine controllata (DOC) and denominazione di origine control-
lata e garantita (DOCG) average e3.14 per liter (ANI International/European Commission,
2012).
These Protected Designation of Origin (PDO) wines require that a minimum of 85 per-
cent of grapes come from a given geographic area, impose yield restrictions, and guarantee
producer-determined production rules (including allowable grape varieties). France accounts
for 35% of European PDO (AOC) wine production and 54% of European sales value,
whereas Italy, its closest competitor, produces 20% of PGO (DOC/DOCG) sales volume
and 4% of its value. In all, 82% of French wine value is captured by regulated AOC wine
producers, while Italy’s regulated DOC and DOCG wines capture only 47% of Italy’s wine
market value (ISMEA, 2008b,p. 219). French AOC production accounts for 58% of annual
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volumes of zero, as the value gained by the DOC mark is less than the per-bottle fee incurred
to apply the DOC sticker (personal interview, Corrado and Odorici, 2010). And DOC pro-
duction is concentrated: fewer than 100 DOCs account for over 80% of DOC output
(Corrado and Odorici, 2009).
Consumption patterns also vary between our two cases. For French consumers, wine
origin is the primary determinant of wine purchases (d’Hauteville and Sirieix, 2007). The
best-selling wine in each Italian wine region is a local wine (ISMEA, 2008b), and the most
important factor shaping Italian wine purchasing decisions is ‘wine tasted previously’
(Casini et al., 2009). Wine guides and celebrity wine makers have an increasingly pivotal
role in relaying quality to consumers in the Italian context (Corrado and Odorici, 2009).
Thus, consumers in the two countries rely on different indicators to guarantee quality—
French producers and consumer rely on a shared geographic brand as conveyed by the AOC
label (d’Hauteville and Sirieix, 2007), whereas Italian producers and consumers rely princi-
pally on direct experience of brands, ‘wines tasted previously’ and wine guides (ISMEA,
2008b; Casini et al., 2009). The AOC functions as a quality guarantee in the French case,
but it fails to function as a quality guarantee for Italian producers.
5. Market failures in the supply chain
Quality markets are predicated on the ability of producers to guarantee the quality of their
product. This is true not only at the point of sale, but also for transactions throughout the
supply chain. The case of the wine supply chain brings this idea to light. Here, grape growers
have knowledge of the quality of their grapes. But wine merchants—who purchase grapes
and convert them into wine—struggle to reliably verify the quality of large quantities of
grapes. Meanwhile, growers have little incentive to cultivate grapes with high production
costs unless they can reliably convey product quality and secure a fair price. If wine mer-
chants are unable to guarantee quality and growers are unable to secure prices for differenti-
ated production, growers may try to augment their earnings by altering their production
strategies. For example, they may choose to plant higher yielding, lower quality varieties; to
increase grape yields (known to decrease grape quality) and plant too densely; to prune and
pick carelessly; or to keep quality grapes for personal consumption and sell the remainder to
the merchant. This information asymmetry needs to be resolved to maintain incentives for
quality grape production.
While an information asymmetry may benefit growers, wine merchants can possess a
power asymmetry in the absence of institutionalized cooperation. Often a region will have a
very small number of wine merchants and hundreds of growers. The merchant sets the price,
and the grower has little choice but to accept that price, even if the price is below production
costs. This puts downward price pressure on growers, who may again be forced to skimp on
quality. This structure is similar to labor markets where there is abundant and fragmented
labor and few firms, and prices and skill for labor remains low. Both informational and
power asymmetries undermine quality production. Producers ultimately choose how to
address these asymmetries both within the supply chain and at the final point of sale. The
mix of political and market-based solutions is not equally available to producers in all con-
texts, yet how one balances these asymmetries has significant implications for a producer’s
ability to construct the idea of product differentiation.
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6. French wine: the politics of value construction
6.1 The political advantages of French wine producers
French wine regulation developed as producers sought to create market barriers to guard
against an increasingly competitive market, building upon preexisting political capacities
and constructing a specific, protected idea of quality production. In addition to having a
small, scattered cadre of quality producers in Bordeaux, Champagne and Burgundy, French
producers had political tools which enabled them to expand this brand recognition to pro-
tect nearby producers who struggled to compete with lower-priced grapes from Southern
France, Algeria and Italy.
The first political advantage 20th-century French producers had over their Italian coun-
terparts was a history of producer politicization, notably a history of producer organization,
political rights and a common identity. French producers have a history of politicization and
organization dating from the mid- to late 19th century (Loube`re, 1978; Simpson, 2011). For
example, the societe´ des viticulteurs de France became an important contact between many
local wine organizations and the wine group within parliament prior to the creation of pro-
tective geographic regulation (Loube`re, 1978, p. 354), and growers and merchants had a
history of local institutionalized cooperation dating from the late 19th century. Unlike their
Italian counterparts, French producers were often landowning peasants with the right to
vote and the ability to apply political pressure; and they frequently specialized in grape pro-
duction, whereas their Italian counterparts tended toward polyculture farming. The role of
specialized production meant first that French producers had an identity as a ‘vignernon’
(grape grower), and secondly, that when grape prices collapsed, the livelihood of these pro-
ducers was acutely impacted. Both of these factors increased the likelihood of political
action.
Second, regional French producers shared a common interest: protecting the connection
between French wine area names and the idea of quality wine. An idea of ‘terroir’ existed in
French quality wine making: that soil characteristics, weather and certain growing practices
led to superior wine production. French wines have dominated the quality market since the
17th century, when European aristocrats exhibited preferences for certain Champagnes,
Burgundies and Bordeaux. Though only a handful of producers in these regions made qual-
ity wines, table wine producers benefitted from the geographic name recognition generated
by quality producers.
A third political advantage of French wine producers is the history of a strong centralized
French state and of centralized quality regulation. The state had the bureaucratic capacity to
intervene in attempts to influence production outcomes, and in the interwar period, such
intervention was commonplace. Further, the French state has played a significant role in reg-
ulating quality production dating from the 17th century (Shonfield, 1965, p. 79), construct-
ing centralized, state-backed definitions of quality. Quality was determined by the Sun King,
regulated by his finance minister Colbert, and the King’s taste would be replicated by his
court and through the social hierarchy. Consumers demonstrated their sophistication by
converging on the king’s definition of quality (Elias, 1978). State strength influenced pro-
ducers in two ways: first, wine merchants knew that if they did not address the politically
powerful growers, the state would intervene, potentially damaging their markets. Secondly,
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with producers and consumers as legitimate, as well as how producers conceptualized of
how to protect their markets from competitors.
These three factors shaped how producers organized to protect their markets during the
economic crisis of the early 20th century. Price fluctuations in the late 19th century increas-
ingly politicized growers and led merchants to seek out new, cheaper grape suppliers and
brand these extraterritorial grapes with the names of known French regions. Growers
viewed this as ‘fraud’ and blamed wine merchants for sustained depressed grape prices, lead-
ing to recurring grower riots in the first decades of the 20th century. After initially relying
on state intervention to repress the riots, Champagne merchants took active steps to achieve
political peace with growers to keep the French state at bay and limit their ability to ‘destroy’
a quality market, as they appeared to be doing through their increased intervention in the
Bordeaux market (Kladstrup and Kladstrup, 2010).
Champagne merchants saw a political opportunity: if merchants only bought
‘Champagne’ grapes from producers within a clearly defined area, growers would follow
detailed production instructions, including: allowable grape varieties, yield limits, planting
standards and pruning standards, among others. These grapes—and only these grapes—can
be used to make Champagne wines, thus guaranteeing that all Champagne grapes adhere to
certain quality standards and production limits. Essentially, growers receive access to a type
of monopoly over Champagne grape production in exchange for assuring merchants that
grapes are of a certain quality level. Thus, terroir is constructed of two components: geo-
graphic origin and ‘know-how’. The first component protects growers (solving the power
asymmetry) and the second component protects merchants (solving the information asym-
metry). This model was soon adopted by Bordeaux producers, who abandoned their state-
led market intervention in favor of the producer-led Champagne model. Other regions soon
followed suit.
6.2 The mechanics and consequences of French producer politics
The state-backed regulation codifies production agreements reached by unionized local pro-
duction actors. The structure works as follows: the grower-merchant council (the interpro-
fessional council) serves as a local regulatory body uniting these actors under a geographic
brand. The council splits power equally between growers and merchants. The growers are
organized into syndicats (unions), and within the syndicat, each grower has one vote,
regardless of output. Membership in the syndicat is mandatory for AOC growers. The
elected leaders of the syndicat share power and have an equal number of positions as the
merchants’ union on the council, and the presidency of the council rotates between a grower
and a merchant union representative. The principle mission of the council is to promote and
protect the shared geographic brand, and to that end, their tasks have included investing in
shared research, in advertising and promotion, and in creating and protecting their agreed
upon rules of production.
The 1935 producer-led organization represented a sharp break from the dirigiste state-
led model of economic intervention guiding French table wine production and broader
French industrialization organization in the interwar era. The interprofessional council pro-
vides a legitimate and institutionalized voice for two formerly adversarial groups to reach
agreement on production standards and prices. The council equalizes power between two
previously unequal players: traditionally weak, numerous, and interchangeable growers on
the one hand and the larger, more powerful merchants on the other. The grower







PI Study of Societies user on 20 January 2020
organization was sufficiently effective to provide a meaningful guarantee to French mer-
chants. These structures balance both the informational asymmetry and the power asymme-
try. And unlike the structure of French labor unions, where ideological cleavages divide
workers’ groups and lessen their ability to maintain durable bargains with employer groups,
united grower groups provide a sufficient force to effectively cooperate with organized mer-
chants. Indeed, the French interprofessional structure resembles the corporative-associative
order described by Streeck and Schmitter in German industry: stable and strategically inter-
dependent interest associations, contracting together to achieve a symmetry in their respec-
tive resources, where each association has a monopoly as an intermediary for the group they
represent (Streeck and Schmitter, 1985, p. 126).
The interprofessional council structure shifted the balance of political power from wine
merchants and toward grape growers within geographically protected areas. And as growers
began cooperating with merchants, they ensured that high grape quality and adherence to
traditional production became profitable for actors throughout the production chain. For
example, Champagne grape growers have a monopoly over Champagne grape production,
enabling them to earn an average of e5.50 per kilo. Champagne merchants pay more for
their grapes than any other wine merchants. But instead of making Champagne uncompeti-
tive, the quantity of Champagne is severely constricted, allowing producers to price their
wines at an average of e21.34 per liter, four times the average price of regulated French
wines (ANI International/European Commission, 2012). This protects farmers, but wine
merchants are better off as well, as both parties benefit from the restricted supply, the per-
ceived qualitative difference and the subsequent idea of Champagne as a status product. To
frame this in Gereffi’s terminology, this is a producer-driven market, where value rests with
a production input. The differentiated production input is the Champagne grape, due to the
concept of terroir.
In 1935, a quasi-governmental institution (the institut national de l’origine et de la qual-
ite´ or INAO) and national regulation (the appellation d’origine controˆle´e or AOC) emerged
to support and reinforce these local institutional innovations. These organizations enabled
growers and merchants to jointly define ‘best production practices’ under the state-
sanctioned geographic brand; the INAO can accept or reject the producers’ definition of
quality, but they cannot amend it. By this set of rules, the INAO institutionalized the politi-
cal dominance of elite producers and their idea that historically dominant producers inher-
ently create superior quality wines. The INAO has, in turn, shaped the definition of quality
and the subsequent political objectives of the French Ministry of Agriculture.
To summarize, the quality wine market is an example of strong producer groups enhanc-
ing and protecting their market. French producers had specific advantages which they effec-
tively capitalized upon to translate political power into economic power. With a history and
belief in terroir and identities as vingnerons, growers prioritized a singular identity and sin-
gular local unions, preventing the ideological fragmentation that weakened French industrial
unions. Wine merchants stepped in to craft a compromise with growers to preempt market
intervention by a strong centralized state. Finally, French producers used the state’s history
as the centralized quality regulator to the producer’s advantage, as the state put their
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6.3 Creating quality markets: consequences of AOC regulation
French AOC wine regulation creates distinct groups of winners and losers while codifying
and exporting the politically constructed particularities of French notions of quality to the
rest of the globe. The principle success of the AOC is not in protecting quality producers
who already had a degree of individual brand recognition, but rather in limiting price com-
petition and spreading quality production from a small number of producers in a limited
number of regions to the majority of producers in a plurality of French regions. The success
of the French wine market is less about the inherent quality of their terroir and more the
result of effective producer organizations, which limit the ability of growers to reduce qual-
ity and costs. Terroir may or may not be real, but the idea of terroir creates an incentive for
producers to work together, to share best practices, and to create a shared brand. France
perhaps does not have a superior terroir to other New World producers, but they have a
stronger idea of terroir. Producers in a single geographic area see their fortunes as linked.
While the AOC creates value for protected producers, it tends to reinforce pre-existing
status differences between French regions, regions which perhaps vary less in their terroir
quality and more in their historical wealth levels. Terroir and the broader AOC regulation
reflect the assumption that quality is ‘God given’ rather than something that can be attained
through effort and merit (Fourcade, 2012). Yet the producers with the most sought-after ter-
roir are the historically wealthy estate holders who were able to afford more expensive pro-
duction methods (Fourcade, 2012). Conversely, cheap, mass-produced French wine was
found in one of the poorest regions of France, Languedoc-Roussillon. Northern and Central
France typically produced quality AOC wines for most of the 20th century, and Southern
France typically produced table wines. The INAO is composed of ‘quality wine experts’,
which include growers, wine merchants, geologists, lawyers and other professionals. The
quality wine experts tend to overrepresent the traditional AOC producers and their interests.
The dominance of traditional quality producers in the INAO contributes to the current
notion that ‘quality’ at the INAO is not found in regions which are producing high-quality
terroir wines; instead ‘quality’ is less important than ‘tradition’ (personal interview Bernard
Martin, 2011, INAO Narbonne). Implicit here is the idea that producers who historically
have produced quality wines possess superior methods as compared to market newcomers;
their heritage is evidence of their quality. This definition prevents new and innovative
Southern quality producers—such as those in Cite´ de Carcasonne—from securing an AOC
certification. This approach defends the rents of those who have already secured AOC certif-
ication while more broadly protecting an elite-defined notion of quality. This begs the ques-
tion as to whether wine regulation codifies class divisions.
More broadly, the model of both AOC production and consumption are oriented toward
deep principles of class and exclusion that characterized the ancien re´gime. By placing value
in a feature that is impossible for most to perceive—the process of production—French pro-
ducers created both a restricted market supply and, among consumers, a clear group of
‘insiders’, differentiated by their refined taste. For taste and knowledge must be slowly
acquired and built up, it cannot be bought, and cannot be faked by the nouveau bourgeois.
In other words, the AOC was homologous to the French system of class, differentiation and
distinction.
Finally, elite French producers have succeeded in institutionalizing the notion of terroir
at both the European and the international levels. In 2011, the European Union institution-
alized the Protected Designation of Origin mark (PDO), modeled on the French AOC
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system. The French Ministry of Agriculture is profoundly influenced by the wine industry-
dominated INAO. They played a pivotal role in fighting for French producer interests and
protecting terroir-based regulation at the EU level (Smith et al., 2007). The notion of terroir
was further disseminated at the international level through the French-dominated
International Office of Wine and the Vine (OIV). Through these institutions, French pro-
ducers have successfully institutionalized a French notion of quality, based on terroir. Even
in the New World, producers and consumers speak of terroir and area of geographic origin.
This provides a type of ‘first mover’ advantage to French producers who shape the quality
definition for future market competitors.
In sum, French quality producers constructed regulation to stabilize their markets against
both competitors and state intervention, creating powerful producer organizations while
defining the quality terrain for future market entrants. The French AOC idea was homolo-
gous with French ideas of tradition and class. In interprofessional councils, we find ‘pro-
ducer-driven markets’ in which grape differentiation and scarcity support market structures
where producers create, rather than respond to, demand. French producers had a history of
political activity and political organization, a state with some history of centralized quality
regulation, and a common idea (of terroir) to unite production actors that were previously
in conflict. Without these political tools, Italian producers remained comparatively weak,
fragmented and disadvantaged; their ability to create the strong institutions and durable
compromises that characterize the French wine market was constrained.
7. Italian wine politics
Italian growers are politically fragmented in comparison to their French counterparts
(Loube`re, 1978), weakening their ability to link wine quality to a shared geographic brand.
Instead, quality has been defined principally by individual brands. A fragmented production
structure makes it more difficult for producers both to restrict access to the primary inputs
of production and to define these inputs as constitutive of quality. As a result, Italian pro-
ducers find themselves responding more to market signals and in a more active ‘con-
versation’ with consumers than their French counterparts. To the Italian producer, the
consumer still knows best; to the French producer, regulation should protect quality produc-
tion from the tastes of unsophisticated consumers (personal interviews: General Manager,
Bordeaux, 2009; Wine Merchant, Burgundy, 2011; Wine Producer, Emilia-Romagna, 2010;
Wine Journalist, Tuscany, 2009).
7.1 Political circumstances of Italian wine producers
Italian producers found themselves with few institutional tools to develop compromise and
collaboration. To begin, Italian producers lacked the political history that propelled their
Gallic counterparts to form effective, bottom-up producer organizations. Italian farmers
tended to be polycultural farmers without strong identities as ‘grape growers’ (personal
interview Aldo Vacca, 2011). This had two consequences. First, farmers were more pro-
tected from market volatilities. Second, they were less likely to see themselves as belonging
to a wine ‘pressure group’. Additionally, small farmers lacked the right to vote until just
before the beginning of World War I, so they had limited means of pressuring the govern-
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Secondly, Italian producers had no common idea of ‘terroir’—or another strong unifying
idea—to motivate producers to compromise. Additionally, Italian growers had not experi-
enced the dramatic price fluctuations experienced by their French counterparts, and the fluc-
tuation they did experience were tempered by their economic reliance on other crops. This
further weakened the incentive for growers to organize as a cohesive interest group. Italian
growers did not hold any political power vis-a`-vis wine merchants when regulations were
implemented because, without an idea of terroir, their grapes were completely substitutable
and not in high demand. Italian growers remained politically weak both before and after the
implementation of the geographic regulations in 1963, and political and economic power
tended to remain with large merchants and, later, distributors. Italian merchants faced nei-
ther strongly politicized growers nor a strong state that might intervene on behalf of the
growers. Merchants had little pressure to compromise their dominant market position.
Further, there was no history of institutionalized cooperation among growers and mer-
chants, as there was in the French case. A negotiated and legitimate institutionalized com-
promise between two powerful groups was hardly an option in the Italian wine context.
Local producer organizations emerged without the parallel construction of a common politi-
cal identity and without the impetus for negotiated compromise. Instead, local wine politics
were characterized by distrust and factionalism.
Notably, Italian quality regulation developed as an attempt to improve wine quality, as
opposed to a response to a politicized economic crisis. Italy’s Ministry of Agriculture con-
structed the DOC in 1963, at a time when Italy was rapidly industrializing and most Italians
still drank mass-produced wine (Clavel, 2008). The flow of workers from rural farms to
northern urban centers expanded rapidly throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s, and the
Italian economy lifted people out of poverty at the highest rate in the country’s history.
During this time, growers and merchants were not experiencing market contraction—if any-
thing, production benefited from market expansion. The need to stabilize fluctuating grape
prices—a principal driver behind French grower politicization in the early 20th century—
was less relevant to the Italian wine market in the postwar period. Their problem was,
rather, chronically low prices: Italian producers needed instead to create value and enhance
quality.
Finally, perceptions of the national bureaucracy as a legitimate guarantor of quality dif-
fer significantly between these two cases. In Italy, quality was hierarchical and defined by
the local courts; but a national conception of quality never emerged. Quality knowledge is
deep in Italy, but it is not centralized. It is taught on the local level by the family, is taught by
direct experience and is a part of the regional fabric. Additionally, Italian bureaucracy is per-
ceived to lack the autonomy needed to construct and implement regulation to the benefit of
Italian society as a whole; specifically, many view the state bureaucratic structure as vulner-
able to manipulation by the elite.2 This perception shaped both producer and consumer
behavior.
7.2 The mechanics and consequences of Italian DOC regulation
The AOC had already proven effective in increasing price and quality for French producers,
and the Italian Ministry of Agriculture created parallel institutions in an attempt to duplicate
2 For specific accusations of political corruption in quality wine regulation, see http://www.vinoalvino.
org.







PI Study of Societies user on 20 January 2020
French market successes. For instance, the Italian comitato nationale della vita del vino mir-
rored the public–private French Institute national de l’origine et de la qualite´ (INAO). The
comitato is composed of technocratic industry experts who are independent of the govern-
ment yet formally reside under the Ministry of Agriculture. The DOC’s consorzio was the
equivalent of the French interprofessional council, made up of local growers and merchants
creating shared production standards. Like France’s interprofessional councils, the Italian
consorzio split voting power evenly between growers and merchants, at least for the DOC’s
first three decades. The disciplinario, meanwhile, is the Italian version of the AOC’s cahier
des charges: a written document describing the attributes of a protected wine (including
appellation boundaries, maximum yields and allowable grape varieties). The wine regulation
attempted to increase the price and quality of Italian wine by restricting the quantity of pro-
tected grapes, codifying production practices, protecting shared geographic names and con-
structing local producer organizations.
Formally, Italian quality regulation was identical to French quality regulation. In prac-
tice, however, these regulatory regimes functioned in radically different manners due to the
perceived illegitimacy of the regulation in Italy. French wine regulation was intended to
enhance and protect quality wine production, while Italian wine regulation was intended to
improve upon existing production practices. The comitato nationale della vita del vino liber-
ally granted the DOC as a means of both improving quality by codifying emerging ‘best
practice’ procedures and differentiating ‘quality’ producers via a government quality mark.
As one observer explained: ‘We made DOC instructions to improve production practices.
The point was to learn how to make good wine . . .. There were not any quality Italian wines
at that time that were at risk of being imitated’ (personal interview, Zampi, 2010.). In this
sense, the goal of Italy’s Ministero d’agricoltura was market building, not political
stabilization.
Additionally, the historical perception of the state as clientelistic influences the strategies
of producers, who may seek to use elite networks to create favorable policy outcomes. At
the same time, this perception of national regulation as historically shaped by clientelistic
ties undermines the strength of any regulation, even regulation that may theoretically be
obtained through legitimate means, or regulation that may protect legitimate wines. Thus,
the perception of the state as a clientelistic tool undermines the ability of Italian producers to
produce quality wines.
DOC protection was sometimes granted as an electoral quid-pro-quo (you vote for me,
I deliver a DOC certification); other times comitato members would grant themselves DOC
certifications (personal interview, wine journalist Franco Ziliani, 2009). This political nature
of the DOC prevented the regulation from delivering effective results. ‘When you want to
create a new area, you need to allow people to experiment, learn, and find the best quality.
Instead, politicians are in a rush to give a value-added to their constituents’ (personal inter-
view, Zampi, 2010). Instead, the DOC provided a quality guarantee to many wines that had
not yet found their highest quality production practices as a means to secure political
patronage (personal interviews: Ziliani, 2009; wine industry expert 2009; Italian enologist,
2010; Zampi, 2010). This harms the evolution of the sector in three ways. First, it may slow
down the process of innovation (at least among some producers). Second, it may stigmatize
the shared local geographic brand if the region is associated with a low-quality wine. Third,
the protection of lower-quality wines weakens the value of other DOC certifications, as the
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Thus, the production practices protected by the nascent DOC were frequently subpar
and sometimes actually damaged the wine (personal interviews, Zampi, 2010; Vacca,
2011); producers could make better quality wines by leaving the appellation. The
‘SuperTuscan’ phenomenon in the 1970s is an extreme example of this: a few producers
believed the local Chianti DOC regulations could be improved upon by dramatically chang-
ing some of the production rules. One production rule required all Chianti producers to add
white wine grapes to Chianti, which SuperTuscan producers perceived as a regulatory
requirement rooted in political favors rather than quality concerns (interview at Antinori,
2009). The new SuperTuscan wines not only garnered Italian wine producers international
recognition and ‘luxury’ prices, the label also meant that the most expensive were in the
‘lowly’ table wine category. In this case and in others, consumers found higher-priced,
higher quality wines outside of the DOC regulation. These developments weakened the
legitimacy of the DOC mark and encouraged alternative judgment devices to emerge; by the
early 1980s, wine guides were prominent in the Italian quality market (Corrado and
Odorici, 2004). One quality winemaker and political leader in Emilia-Romagna, summariz-
ing the market influence of the DOC, said: ‘Regulation is less important than wine experts.
People don’t trust the government mark.’ Here, either political linkages or the perception of
them have the same effect: undermining the producer-state feedback loop and undermining
the trust between market insiders and outsiders. This then weakens the ‘fit’ of the policy, the
level of consumer trust in the appellation mark and the producers’ ability to create a ‘con-
structed comparative advantage’.
The initial Italian DOC regulation failed to support quality wine production, and in
1992 the structure of the local consorzio was amended to reflect the market preferences of
larger, successful producers, the same producers who reportedly have ties with the national
comitato (personal interviews, Italian wine journalist 2010; assistant to comitato member
2011).3 The local consorzio structure changed from the initial French style (with an even
division of power between growers and merchants) to a new model where voting power is
proportional to production output, regardless of supply chain position. In other words, it is
irrelevant if someone is a grower, a merchant, or both. Votes are weighed by production
volume—which favors large producers. This change was made to encourage Italian pro-
ducers to adapt a ‘market mentality’, but the consequence of this procedural shift is a further
division between small producers (who try to compete on a differentiated product) and large
producers (who produce on economies of scale). Instead of increasing the political power of
small growers, the voting structure just reflects power asymmetries from the marketplace:
Grower power remains weak, and the ability to define brand and value is located within
large firms who have the ability to transform the grape. Producer institutions, then, reflect
and institutionalize power discrepancies between producers.
3 The DOCG was also introduced in 1992. The label was initially granted to wines which had already
obtained some international brand recognition; thus, wines in this category have earned higher aver-
age prices than DOC wines. However, even within the DOCG, accusations of political corruption
abound (Personal Interview Ziliani, 2009), and only three DOCGs dominate the market.
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7.3 Creating Italian wine markets: the consequences of producer politics and
DOC regulation
Weak grower protection is associated with buyer-driven supply chains and increased market
competition. Specifically, large producers and merchants buy the majority of their grapes
from growers; thus, they have the objective not to make grapes scarce and expensive, but to
minimize the cost of the grapes they buy. And over the past few decades, one can observe an
emphasis on market expansion in some quality Italian wine regions, undermining the quan-
tity constraints the luxury market relies upon. This may explain why the number of bottles
of Montalcino increased by nearly 50% in the eight years from 1998 to 2006 (Corrado and
Odorici, 2009, p. 9). Some of this increase is due to the city’s expanding geographic limits,
which today make Montalcino the third-largest Italian city (as measured by surface area).
The interests of large producers trumped the interests of small producers and growers.
While some voluntaristic producer organizations emerged over the past few decades, they
failed to provide a reliable solution to the aforementioned market asymmetries. Rather, they
reflected divisions among producers. As a result, grape prices remained low, and grapes
remained of variable quality.
Today, large branded firms dominate the Italian wine sector4 (ISMEA, 2008b; Stasi
et al., 2010). Given that larger Italian wineries are not vertically integrated, these concen-
trated firms could theoretically exercise monopsony when setting grape prices for farmers
(ISMEA, 2008b; Stasi et al., 2010, p. 2). Without mechanisms of coordination, the balance
of power within the wine market remains heavily skewed in favor of large firms. This market
structure increases the downward price pressure on Italian growers, causing producers to
seek cost-minimization strategies, which are not compatible with quality production. These
two variables—large branded firms and downward price pressure on growers—would be
expected to contribute to the relatively stronger reliance on technology in wine-making, due
to the ability of technology to construct a more standardized brand taste and to cover grape
flaws.
The technological reliance in wine-making is thus the result of persistent information
asymmetries, and it reflects a shift away from an emphasis on unique grape qualities and ter-
roir. A low-cost input and reliance on quality-enhancing technology may provide a short-
run market advantage to some large firms, but overall it inhibits quality producers from
attaining product attributes associated with singularity, uniqueness and higher prices. The
Zinquisition summarizes the differences between these styles as follows: ‘Terroir-driven
wines are often associated with wines of a ‘natural’ style . . . with limited human interven-
tion. Style-driven wines are wines where a winemaker strives to create a wine of a certain
style . . .. These wines are also thought by critics to reveal less of their terroir as those subtle-
ties are masked by (human) intervention’ (cited in Corrado and Odorici, 2009, p. 115).
Finally, technology also becomes important when brand ‘consistency’ drives product
strategy.
Producer politics, subsequent differences in supply chain dynamics, and resulting defini-
tions of quality shape the extent to which a product distinguishes itself from similar competi-
tors. French producer politics supports a supply chain structure that protects differentiated
4 In all, 32% of Italy’s national wine market share is held by only nine firms, of which eight face elastic
demand curves. The next 37% of market share is held by 684 firms, with Italy’s 72 000 other wineries
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production inputs. While this inhibits producer flexibility, French producers are perceived to
be above the concerns of market demand, as the terroir principle protects ‘tradition’ from
market trends and explicitly inhibits market adaptation. On the other hand, weaker Italian
producer organizations and less effective state regulation inhibit the protection of primary
supply chain inputs, increasing producer flexibility but causing producers to find themselves
in a more competitive, less differentiated market space. Italian producers are left to follow
demand rather than to defend it, not due to any inherent quality fault of Italian producers,
but due to variation in producer politics and subsequent market structures. These market
observations provide insight into the role of politics, organization and the distribution of
market power in constructing comparative advantages in high value-added markets
(Table 1).
8. Conclusions
This article set out to demonstrate that their market dominance is a matter not of inherent
French terroir superiority, but rather of a superior method of political organization, specifi-
cally, how producers solve the problem of supply chain asymmetries. By constructing robust
institutions that redistributed market power further up the supply chain, French producers
constructed a product that was perceived to be qualitatively different: wine with unique ter-
roir, or the traditional best expression of a delimited geographic area. Italian wine regula-
tion, conversely, followed the successful French example, but without the political attributes
which enabled their French counterparts to create strong institutions. Addressing supply
chain failures though representative political institutions ultimately yielded superior out-
comes as compared to relying primarily on the price mechanism to coordinate transactions.
The lack of Italian political cohesion meant that market power structures remained rela-
tively unaltered. Powerful actors had dominated the market, and this power structure
remained intact, although the formal French regulatory mechanism was used as a model.
Without cohesive producer groups, the mechanism could not redistribute power. Italian
wine regulation failed because Italian grape growers were too weak, due their historical
political and economic context. Italian wine politics, then, resembles 20th century Italian
industrial organization, which is also characterized by weak and fragmented labor unions,
as well as the elite–insider linkages which characterized postwar Italian politics.
At the heart of political organization, we find weak and atomized individuals who aggre-
gate their power to challenge concentrated power. Conversely, core liberal market tenets
rest upon the uncoordinated activity of rational actors, guided by the invisible hand of
Table 1. A comparison of wine market structures
French Quality Market (AOC) Italian Quality Market (DOC)
Nature of competition Quality Hybrid: Price/quality intersection.
Who sets standards Wine industry Market
Dominant judgment devices Appellation Direct knowledge
Patterns of producer organization Corporatist-associational Autarchic-associational
Producer or buyer driven Producer driven Buyer driven
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self-interest. Wine politics show us that within market economies, we find the same political
movements we see in the political arena. Markets, like politics, consist of institutions that
differentially embed, codify and distribute power. In the case of France, small, individually
weak wine producers became powerful in the aggregate; united French growers came
together to force a deal with the economically powerful wine merchants. In contrast, small,
Italian producers failed to cooperate systematically and aggregate their power. Stronger
political organization enabled the construction of an institutional comparative advantage,
higher prices and greater demand inelasticity for regulated French terroir wines.
Economic sociologists claim markets are socially embedded. Markets, though, are also
politically embedded, reflecting the ability or failure of actors to come together to address
collective market failures. To separate economics from the social or political context is to
have a dangerously limited view of market functionality and to relegate oneself to a buyer-
driven market (i.e. mass market). Some market actors may see the maintenance of individual
political and economic power to be in their self-interest, and they may see the continued
weakness and fragmentation of other supply chain actors as a positive market attribute, as
the powerful producers can push down prices for their suppliers and theoretically approach
Pareto efficiency. This is one market structure, but it is a market which primarily competes
on price and thus ultimately has a less stable market advantage. State regulation is perceived
here to be an impediment to responding to the markets. My analysis indicates that regula-
tion that reflects the political compromise and power sharing among supply chain actors
could lead to differentiated quality production structures. This possibility, however, is not
equally accessible across economic and political contexts.
Luxury markets create much of their value through intangible characteristics, something
my interview subjects often describe as the ‘dream’ associated with product. This dream is
constructed in a myriad of ways, including controlled distribution, the idea of tradition and
heritage, and product scarcity. However, there are intangible assets which help quality pro-
ducers construct this idea of product differentiation. The present analysis diverges from past
studies by concretely linking a new set of intangible variables—summarized as ‘producer
politics’—and links them concretely to different market structures. In other words, I demon-
strate how the intangible begets the intangible. This analysis raises the notion that whether
or not terroir is real, the belief in terroir assists French producers because the shared belief
influences how producers organize and, ultimately, how they produce. Politics matters for
quality producers—this is an oft-repeated refrain from political economists. But beyond
that, we find that strong institutions provide a critical market advantages for quality pro-
ducers, as they support the supply chain dynamics and state-producer relationships which
give rise to stable, high value-added production. These strong institutions and the social
norms they engender create the foundation for long-term market stability.
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